The European elections have changed the distribution of seats in the European Parliament: Overall, the right-wing and new parties gained seats, while the Greens and left-wing parties lost seats (see EuropeElects for details).

The actual effects of this new distribution of seats will only become apparent after the formation of political groups and possible realignments, especially in certain policy areas. However, five overarching theses can be derived from the election results as to what they mean for the future of EU climate policy.

1. Narrower majorities, but “Green Deal” majority remains intact (in theory)

The new political majorities in the European Parliament have become narrower, with implications for the future of climate policy. Nevertheless, the parties that have been the main supporters of the Green Deal – the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe and the Greens – have together won 467 out of 720 seats in the Parliament, according to current projections (as of 19:30, EuropeElects). This shows that, in theory, there is still a solid majority in the European Parliament to pass climate policy. However, this “Green Deal” majority requires the members of the political groups to vote coherently – a prerequisite that was not always met in the last legislative period, especially in the case of the largest and most important group, the EVP. Majorities will be particularly contested on legislation relating to the agricultural sector.

2. No complete rollback of climate policy until 2030 – decisions for 2031-2040 are key

Despite the change in majorities, a full rollback of climate policy until 2030 is unlikely. Not only are there no points of intervention in the political processes, but such a rollback would also require many individual majority decisions in the European Parliament and between the member states. Therefore, the fundamental architecture and the climate headline goals are unlikely to be affected. Instead, the discussion on the content of the next phase of climate policy (2031-2040) will be of central importance. On the other hand, individual symbolic decisions – such as the ban on internal combustion engines or the renaturation law – could become part of the negotiating package in order to find a majority for a new Commission.

The next steps in European climate policy are already clear: First up is the proposal for the 2040 climate target, which the Commission will present in 2025. This will be followed by the post-2030 climate policy (revision of the emissions trading system, burden sharing, LULUCF, etc.). These concrete steps are crucial for achieving the EU’s long-term climate goals and for taking the Green Deal forward. Whether climate policy remains ambitious enough to achieve net zero by 2050 will largely depend on these decisions (and whether Member States implement them).

3. More complex negotiations within and between the political groups – the Parliament could lose importance

The adoption of climate policy will require significantly more negotiation within and between the political groups.  This will make it less likely that the Parliament will adopt strategically far-reaching positions, as it has done in the past, in order to have a better starting point for negotiations with the Member States, and could reduce the importance of the Parliament as a whole. The key challenge will be to rebuild the willingness to compromise within and between the political groups that was exhausted before the elections. This will require a clear vision and narrative of what the second phase of the Green Deal will entail – especially on the contentious issues of agriculture and industry. In the complex negotiations over majorities and top jobs, the Green Deal narrative is likely to play a key role alongside country and party proportionality.

4. Limits of European industrial policy as part of the Green Deal

Following the parties’ election campaigns, it is to be expected that new industrial policy initiatives will become a central component of the new Green Deal narrative. However, expectations of an industrial policy project as a “signature project” of the new Commission should not be too high. First attempts in this direction before the elections (Net Zero Industry Act) have shown that a strategic industrial policy, which goes hand in hand with a new prioritization of certain sectors, is subject to many veto points in the EU’s decision-making processes. The new, narrower majorities make a major breakthrough in industrial policy (beyond rhetorical commitment) even less likely.

5. EU enlargement as a potential new challenge for climate policy

Beyond climate policy, one of the fundamental political challenges for the new Commission will be the issue of EU enlargement. The long-term planning horizon of climate and energy policy between 2031 and 2040 requires that possible enlargement options be taken into account in planning and that policy instruments be designed in such a way that they do not stand in the way of enlargement. As enlargement will divide the Member States and political parties, gradual “phase-in” paths for new Member States should be considered at an early stage, without undermining the climate policy of the existing EU-27 Member States (e.g. in the emissions trading system, land use, etc.).